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Unemployment Duration and 
the Duration of Entitlement to 
Unemployment Benefit1 
Elena G. F. Stancanelïi 
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the duration of enti-
tlement to unemployment benefit and the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment for Britain. Interest in this topic is heightened by the 1993 
UK Budget announcement that the duration of entitlement to the national 
insurance unemployment benefit will be reduced to six months from 1995. 
According to the theory, the individual probability of leaving unemploy-
ment increases near the time of exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit because of increased search intensity and lowered reservation wage. 
(Mortensen, 1977, Moffit and Nicholson, 1982, Van den Berg, 1990). Gener-
ally, empirical studies have confirmed the theoretical predictions. Examples 
are: for the U. S. , Katz (1986), Katz and.Meyer (1988, 1990), Meyer (1990), 
Han and Hausman (1990); for Canad#v Ham and Rea (1987); for the Nether-
lands, van den Berg (1990) and Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993). 
No attempt has been made untilAhe present study to estimate the impact 
*Part of the analysis contained in this paper was carried out while I was a PhD student 
at the European University Institute, in Florence. I am indebted for helpful advice to John 
Micklewright, Robert Waldmann, Geert Ridder, Göetz Rohwer, Lavan Mahadeva, Gerard 
van den Berg, Jan van Ours and the participants of seminars at the Vrije Universiteit of 
Amsterdam, the University of Tilburg and the University of Leiden. Patrick Heady is to 
be thanked for having made the data available. All errors are mine. 
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of the exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment benefit on the individual 
re-employment probability for the UK, at least to my knowledge. However, 
on the basis of cross-countries comparisons, based on aggregate time-series 
data, it was possible to conclude that the duration of entitlement to un-
employment benefit infiuences the rate of unemployment and the expected 
duration of unemployment in a number of countries among which also the U. 
K. (Burda, 1988). The main drawback of these studies is that it is difficult 
to construct a satisfactory aggregate measure of the level and the duration 
of unemployment benefit since normally benefit payments vary considerably 
across individuals. 
Previous UK studies have investigated how the impact of the level of un-
employment benefit on the hazard rate varies over time with the lengthened 
duration of the unemployment spell (Narendranathan et al. 1985, Naren-
dranathan and Stewart, 1993a ad 1993b). The impact of the level of un-
employment benefit on the hazard rate has been found to decline as the 
individual spell of unemployment progresses. In particular, the effect of the 
level of unemployment benefit becomes statistically insignificant after the 
first five or six months of unemployment. However, the UK unemployment 
benefit schemes are such that the level of unemployment benefit paid does not 
necessarily decline during the course of the unemployment spell. Therefore, 
this evidence is inconclusive with respect to the impact of unemployment 
benefit exhaustion. Some limited evidence on the effect of the entitlement 
to unemployment benefit on the duration of unemployment is gathered by 
Wadsworth (1991), who analyses data matched from two years of the British 
Labour Force Survey (1983/84). The author finds that non-claimants of un-
employment benefit have lower unemployment durations, due however to a 
higher withdrawal rate from the labour force. Similar results are obtained 
by Schimdt and Wadsworth (1993), who also analyse matched data from the 
Labour Force Survey, for the period 1983-89. The authors investigate the 
impact of entitlement to unemployment benefit on individual search intensity 
and conclude that excluding workers from the benefit system leads them to 
search less extensively. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section I, the main features 
of the unemployment benefit scheme in Britain are briefly described. The 
expected impact of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit on 
the re-employment probability is discussed. The data are described in Section 
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II. The econometrie model is presented in Section III. This is a reduced form 
model of the probability of leaving unemployment. Two destination states 
out of unemployment are distinguished (full-time work and other states) and 
modelled using a competing risks specification. The results of estimation are 
discussed in Section IV. Conclusions follow. 
I. The institutional features of unemployment 
benefit and the entitlement effect 
In Britain, the unemployed has access to two different schemes of unem-
ployment benefit. The first is the national insurance benefit, Unemployment 
Benefit (UB), which is paid conditional on the unemployed showing satisfac-
tory work contributions records. UB has a maximum duration of 52 weeks2. 
The other benefit scheme is the social assistance benefit, Supplementary Ben-
efit (SB) —called Income Support since 1988— which is means-tested and 
unlimited in time. The two schemes of unemployment benefit do not differ 
substantially in amount. They are both flat rate3 with additions for depen-
dent spouse and children. The two benefits can be received simultaneously, 
if the unemployed resources including UB fall below their needs. 
The expected impact of the exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit on the hazard rate is summarized in Figure 0.1. Two groups of the 
unemployed are distinguished: recipients of UB (only) and recipients of SB 
(either on its own or in addition to UB). The type of unemployment benefit 
received is assumed not to vary over time, at least until time "p" when the 
national insurance unemployment benefit UB expires. The hazard rate of 
recipients of UB (only) at the start of their unemployment spell is expected 
to rise near the time of UB exhaustion. The theory is inconclusive with 
regards to the exact length of time to the left of point p, when the hazard 
rate for UB recipients starts to rise. I assume this time to coincide with 
about ten weeks before the exhaustion of entitlement to UB. 
2The maximum duration of entitlement to UB in a given spell of unemployment might 
actually be less than 52 weeks for some unemployed because of the so called "link spell" 
rule; following which unemployment spells separated by less than eight weeks of employ-
ment are counted together as single spells for benefit entitlement purposes. 
3 The Earnings Related Supplement which used to link the amount of UB received to 
the level of previous earnings was abolished in January 1982. 
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UB .recipients 
SB recipients 
unemployment duration 
Figure 0.1: The duration of entitlement effect 
After the exhaustion of UB (time p) the hazard rate of the (once) recip-
ients of UB might remain constant or decrease. However, if the (once) UB 
unemployed start to receive SB upon UB exhaustion, from time p onwards 
their behaviour is likely to resemble that of the SB unemployed. The hazard 
rate might sharply decrease and then remain constant. 
The hazard rate for the recipients of SB is not assumed to vary as a 
function of the potential duration of the benefit, since SB is unlimited in time. 
I assume that the unemployed that receive both types of benefit (UB and SB) 
at the start of their unemployment spell behave as SB recipients (rather than 
as UB recipients) with regard to their expectations of the potential duration 
of the unemployment benefit. Indeed, having successfully passed the means 
test for the award of the social assistance benefit (SB) when they were already 
receiving the national insurance benefit (UB) (especially, at the start of their 
unemployment spell) should make the unemployed quite confident that upon 
exhaustion of entitlement to UB the foregone UB payment will be replaced by 
a corresponding SB payment. Consequently, their job search behaviour will 
not be influenced by the limited duration of UB. This assumption is partly 
supported by the information available in the data on the time pattern of 
unemployment benefit receipts, which is reviewed in the next section. 
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II . A description of the data 
T h e LSUS survey and t h e selection of the sample for analysis 
The data used for the analysis are the Survey of the Living Standard of 
the Unemployed (LSUS), which was carried out by the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS)4 in 1983/1984. These data are largely unexploited5. They 
relate to a time when the rate of unemployment in the UK was high and close 
to the current levels (about 12-13%). Most previous UK applied studies on 
unemployment duration use data that relate to the late seventies when the 
rate of unemployment was much lower. 
The LSUS sample is drawn from the population of the unemployed that 
started to register at Great Britain Unemployment Benefit Offices (UB Os) 
in the Summer of 1983, between 21st June and 20th August 1983 (both un-
employment benefits, UB and SB, are paid at UBOs). The unemployed with 
the following characteristics were sampled: they were either married men 
or single people of either gender living on their own or with their children; 
they were aged between 20 and 58; they had been "signing on"6 continuously 
for three months following the start of their registered unemployment spell. 
Two interviews were carried out with the sample participants. The first took 
place about three months after the start of the sampled unemployment spell, 
in the Autumn of 1983, the second a year later, i. e. in the Autumn of 1984, 
about fifteen months after the start of the sampled unemployment spell. 
Only the male unemployed that participated in the both survey inter-
viewes are analysed here. Female unemployed are analysed in a separate 
piece of work (Stancanelli, 1994). Non-participants to the second inter-
view are dropped from the sample since the information on the duration 
of the unemployment spells was collected retrospectively at time of the sec-
ond interview7. The final sample for econometrie analysis is made up of 1941 
4Now called simply DSS. 
5Until recently, only the survey planners have analyzed the LSUS data, at least to 
my knowledge, and mostly from a descriptive point of view (Heady and Smith, 1989). 
Previous work on these data has been carried out by myself (StancanelK, 1993) and Jones 
et al. (1993). 
6
 "Signing on" means in the British jargon going to social security offices to confirm 
that one is unemployed in order to get state benefits. 
7Non-respondents could have been considered as right-censored at the time of the first 
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male unemployed that reported to receive unemployment benefit (UB or SB) 
at the time of the first interview. 
Benefit receipts 
Out of the 1941 observations selected for econometrie analysis, 736 (38%) 
reported to receive UB (only) at the start of their registered unemployment 
spell —approximated by the time of the first interview— and 1205 (62%) 
reported to receive SB, either on its own or in addition to UB, at the same 
point in time. About 89% of the unemployed that reported to receive joint 
payments of UB and SB at the time of the first interview and that were still 
unemployed at the time of the second interview reported to receive only SB 
at the time of the second interview. The corresponding figure for recipients 
of UB (only) at the time of the first interview was 54.4% (about 40% of 
them report not to receive any benefit at the time of the second interview). 
Overall, about 95% of the unemployed that reported to receive SB, either on 
its own or in addition to UB, at the time of the first interview and that were 
still unemployed at the time of the second interview reported to receive SB at 
the time of the second interview. It therefore emerges that the unemployed 
that receive SB, with or without UB, at the start of their unemployment spell 
are likely to continue to receive SB throughout their unemployment spell. 
Definition of the explanatory variables considered 
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables considered are given in 
Table 0.1. I have distinguished two groups of the unemployed: recipients of 
UB (only)8; recipients of SB (with or without UB). 
I have constructed some dummies that take value one if the unemployed 
person was, respectively, in full-time work or unemployed or sick for the 
largest part of the year preceding the start of the observed spell of registered 
unemployment. The base group for these dummies is made up of those per-
interview. However, given the sample design these observations are also left truncated at 
the time of the first interview. This implies that their contribution to the sample likelihood 
function would cancel out. 
8Some "UB only" unemployed (about 6%, i. e. 49 out of 736) that reported at the time 
of the first interview benefit amounts obviously different from the flat rates UB amounts 
(which are fixed by law) were recoded for the purpose of the construction of these dummies 
as receiving SB. 
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sous whose main activity in the year before the sampled unemployment spell 
was any other, i. e. part-time work, full-time education, government traning 
scheme, housework, prison, non-registered unemployment. The occupation 
dummies take value one if the unemployed's person last job was respectively, 
in a "professional or intermediate'1 occupation or in an "unskilled" occu-
pation. The base group for these dummies are the skilled and semi-skilled 
workers. 
Table 0.1: Descriptive statistics of the economie variables 
Receive UB only Receive SB Benefit receipienta 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Left truncation interval (weeks) 13.3736 1.0473 13.4241 1.0527 13.4049 1.0507 
Unemployment duration (weeka) 45.5340 19.3854 48.2415 18.7074 47.2148 19.0078 
F/t work most part year before U. 0.8111 0.3917 0.5693 0.4954 0.6610 0.4735 
Unemployed moat part year before U. 0.1141 0.3182 0.2896 0.4538 0.2231 0.4164 
Sick, out of work moat part year before 
U. 
Profesaional/Intermediate Occupation 
0.0272 0.1627 0.0398 0.1957 0.0350 0.1839 
0.2269 0.4191 0.1295 0.3358 0.1664 0.3725 
Unakillcd Occupation 0.0584 0.2347 0.0614 0.2402 0.0603 0.2381 
Occupation not available 0.0421 0.2010 0.0846 0.2785 0.0685 0.2527 
Age 20-24 0.0924 0.2898 0.1477 0.3550 0.1267 0.3328 
Age 25-34 0.2065 0.4051 0.4033 0.4908 0.3287 0.4699 
Age 35-44 0.1929 0.3949 0.2805 0.4494 0.2473 0.4316 
Age 45-54 0.2948 0.4563 0.1286 0.3349 0.1917 0.3937 
Age 55-58 0.2133 0.4099 0.0398 0.1957 0.1056 0.3074 
Kas any child old leaa than 5 0.1630 0.3697 0.4639 0.4989 0.3498 0.4770 
Married 0.8859 0.3182 0.8506 0.3566 0.8640 0.34S9 
Spouae working 1 month before U. 0.4565 0.4984 0.1261 0.3321 0.2514 0.4339 
Searchea leaa than before U. 0.1399 0.3472 0.0622 0.2417 0.0917 0.2887 
Values Leiaure more than Labour 0.1875 ,0.3906 0.0988 0.2985 0.1324 0.3390 
Experience aome ahortage of money 0.5897 0.4922 0.8274 0.3781 0.7372 0.4402 
House owner outright/with mortgage 0.4715 0.4995 0.3129 0.4639 0.3730 0.4837 
County unemployment rate 13.4753 3.2963 13.6656 3.1372 13.5935 3.1990 
UB/SB amount in £, logs 3.3945 0.2979 3.7999 0.4316 3.6462 0.4335 
Expected earnings, in £, logs. 4.5001 0.4325 4.4200 0.5330 4.4504 0.4987 
Expected earnings not available 0.0068 0.0822 0.0124 0.1109 0.0103 0.1010 
total savings at tk, £ 2990.7 8694-S 367.5 1488.0 1362 5624.7 
total debt at tk, £ 488.5 1881.0 673.8 3146.7 633.7 2753.9 
Weeks of UB left, 10-6 0.1053 0.3070 
Weeks of UB left, 5-1 0.0985 0.2980 
Weeks of UB left, 0 0.0910 0.2877 
1-3 weeks after UB exhauation 0.0894 0.2853 
4 or more weeka after UB exhauation 0.0820 0.2743 
The number of unemployed receiving Ui. only ia 73 6; 1205 get SB or join tly SB and UB. The t otal number 
of benefit recipienta ia then 1341- "U. " atanda for the observe d unemploi ment spell. The time "tk" relates 
to one month before the atart of the obs erved uner nployment spell. The dichotomo 113 variable 1 take value 
one when the condition atated for each oj them ia aa tisfied. The mean dura tion ia take n over all < obarevationa 
(including the right-cenaored obaervatior 13). The lo_ jarithms 07 e taken ov :r the non-zero observ ations. 
7 
The expected earnings from Work are the fitted earnings from earnings 
equations9. Indeed, the earnings from the last job might be endogenous to 
the model (Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985). The level of unemployment 
benefit is a time varying variable (see Stancanelli, 1993). It is allowed to vary 
for recipients of the national insurance benefit (UB) at the time of exhaustion 
of entitlement to UB. 
Individual wealth or the tightness of the budget constraint is proxied by 
a dummy that takes value one if the unemployed reported to "suffer from 
money shortage" at the time of the first interview. Access to credit or perhaps 
also wealth is proxied by a dummy for house ownership. This variable might 
capture also other unobserved individual characteristics such as capacity to 
plan forward or stability. 
Individual leisure valuation is proxied by a dummy constructed using 
replies to the following question, asked at the time of the first interview: "If 
you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for 
the rest of your life, would you want to have a job or would you prefer not 
to workf". Diminished search intensity is measured by a dummy contructed 
on the basis of the replies given to the following question at the time of the 
first interview: "Here is a list of things people do. We would like to know 
whether you do each thing more or less than you didfour orfive months ago, 
before you started/restarted signing on at an unemployment benefit office • • • 
Visiting an unemployment benefit office or a job centre". These variables are 
measured at the start (or sometime before the start) of the unemployment 
spell to avoid potential endogeneity problems. 
I consider the following variables for age and family composition: age 
dummies, marital status dummy, a dummy for the presence of any child 
aged less than 5 in the nuclear family. I model the spouse's labour force par-
ticipation with a dummy that takes value one if the spouse was working in 
a full-time or part-time job one month before the start of the partner's sam-
pled unemployment spell. This reference time is chosen to avoid endogeneity 
problems due to the possibility the two partners' labour force participation 
decisions are simultaneously determined. 
The rate of unemployment in the local area (the county) is used to capture 
9The procedure adopted was slightly more complicated and it involved imputing ex-
pected earnings for the unemployed for whom the last earnings information was not avail-
able (see Stancanelli, 1993). 
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demand side conditions. 
Do the two groups of unemployment benefit recipients differ? 
From inspection of Table 0.1, it emerges that recipients of UB on its own 
(at the time of the first interview) are more likely on average to have hold a 
full-time job for most part of the year before the start of their observed spell 
of registered unemployment. This finding is plausible given the rales that 
regulate entitlement to UB. 
Recipients of "UB only" seem also more likely to be older on average 
than other types of unemployment benefit recipients. Perhaps, this might be 
explained by the fact that the category "recipients of UB only" exclude the 
unemployed receiving SB in addition to UB, i. e. joint payments of UB and 
SB. The recipients of UB that are aged over forty-five might be more likely 
to have higher levels of savings and therefore they may not be entitled to 
SB. Indeed, recipients of "UB only" at the time of the first interview are on 
average much wealthier than recipients of SB (with or without UB). 
From inspection of Table 0.1, it emerges that the proportion of the un-
employed with diminished search intensity is higher among recipients of "UB 
only". Similarly the proportion of the unemployed that value leisure more 
than labour is higher among the "UB only" group. Perhaps, this is explained 
by the fact that the "UB only" unemployed are on average wealthier than 
the unemployed that receive SB (either on its own or in addition to UB). 
Indeed, higher levels of wealth may result in lower intensity of search and 
higher valuation of leisure as relative to labour (Jones et al. , 1993). 
The distribution of total savings of the unemployed receiving only UB 
or SB (with or without UB) at the time of the first interview is shown in 
Table 0.2 below. The recipients of "UB only" are wealthier than the re-
cipients of "SB". The percentage of the "UB only" unemployed that report 
zero amounts of savings (about 28%) is considerably lower than the corre-
sponding figure (about 51%) for the "SB" unemployed. Almost 100% of the 
unemployed receiving SB (with or without UB) at the time of the first in-
terview report savings below £3000. The same figure for recipients of "UB 
only" is about 73%. Savings of £3000 were the treshold level of savings above 
which the unemployed was not entitled to the means-tested benefit (SB) in 
1982/83. 
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Table 0.2: The amounts of savings at time ofthe first interview 
amounts, £ Receive UB only Receive SB with or without UB 
% cum. % % cum. % 
0 
< 100 
< 200 
< 500 
< 1000 
< 2000 
< 3000 
< 5000 
< 10000 
< 15000 
< 20000 
< 30000 
< 50000 
< 100000 
28.3 
17.1 
5.4 
5.0 
6.0 
6.3 
4.7 
7.8 
7.2 
S.9 
2.1 
3.5 
1.7 
1.0 
28.3 
4S-4 
50.8 
55.8 
61.8 
68.1 
72.8 
80.6 
87.8 
91.7 
93.8 
97.3 
99.0 
100 
51.3 
29.4 
4.5 
4-4 
5.0 
4.5 
0.7 
0.1 
0.1 
51.3 
80.7 
85.2 
89.6 
94.6 
99 
99.8 
99.9 
100 
mean value, £ 4248.1 (SD 11047.0) 153.9 (SD 427.6) 
The total amounts of savings relate to the princival respondent, i. e. the 
svouse's savings (if any) are not taken into account. 
T h e "time left to benefit exhaus t ion " dummies 
The impact of the expected exhaustion of UB is modelled by using a set of 
time varying dummies which take value one in some chosen intervals of time 
for the unemployed that reported to receive only UB at the time of the first 
interview10. The base for these dummies are the unemployed reporting to 
receive SB (either on its own or in addition to UB) and the remaining time 
intervals. 
The following intervals of time before exhaustion of entitlement to unem-
ployment benefit were considered: 
• ten to six weeks of entitlement to UB left before exhaustion of entitle-
ment; 
• five to one weeks of entitlement to UB left; 
• zero weeks of entitlement to UB left, i. e. last week of entitlement to 
UB, which corresponds to the 52nd week of unemployment for more 
than 90% of the recipients of UB at the time of the first interview; 
• from one to three weeks after exhaustion of entitlement to UB; 
• four weeks or more passed the exhaustion of entitlement to UB. 
10This approach is basically the same than that adopted by Katz and Meyer (1988). 
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Introducing these additional time varying dummies for recipients of "UB 
only" in the time intervals going from week 42 onwards is equivalent to 
shifting the baseline hazard rate for the recipients of "UB only" from week 
42 onwards. 
III . The econometrie model 
I adopt a reduced form approach to modelling the individual probabihty of 
leaving unemployment. The probabihty of leaving unemployment is modelled 
as a conditional probabihty using the hazard rate. Job search theory guides 
the choice of covariates and the interpretation of the results. 
Defining time since the start of the unemployment spell as a continuous 
random variable T —where T does not need to be calendar time— with 
cumulative distribution function F(t) = P(T < t) and density function 
f(t) = dF/dt, the hazard rate can be written as follows: 
nM_,.P(t<T<t + dt\T>t) f(t) 
where 1 — F(t) = G(t) is the survivor function. This expression describes 
the probabihty of leaving unemployment at any time, 2, conditional on being 
still unemployed an infinitesimal amount of time to the left of t. 
Different destination states out of unemployment are modelled together 
with the probabihty of leaving unemployment using a a competing risks spec-
ification. The destination states considered are assumed to be mutually ex-
clusive. The conditional probabihty of leaving unemployment at time t and 
of exiting to a specific destination state k —given the set D of destination 
states— can be written as: 
m P^^+^D^Pj^ 
KV ;
 A-o dt 
which is the so-called cause-specific hazard. The overall hazard rate can be 
written as the sum of the hazards of exiting into the different states: 
0(*i,Xi(*)) = £0k(* i ,XiW), (0-3) 
ktD 
where D is the set of destination states. 
The destination states considered here are exit into a full-time job and exit 
into "other states". Other states includes part-time work, full-time educa-
tion, government training schemes, household work, sickness and withdrawal 
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from the labour force. The small number of observations exiting to these 
different states does not allow to model them separately. 
I model the hazard rate using a piecewise exponential functional form. 
This specification has the advantage of not imposing severe constraints on 
the behaviour of the baseline hazard rate, at least if enough "time segments" 
or "pieces" are specified. I allow the baseline hazard rate to vary each week. 
The competing risks hazard rate can be written as follows: 
*(*i, *i(*)) = E «P{<4 + ^ (*)} (0-4) 
keD 
where "m" are the different time intervals specified for the baseline hazard 
rate; "z" is a vector of explanatory variables; "z" relates to the individual 
unemployment spell; %•" is the ending time of the unemployment spell for 
completed spells and the time of right-censoring for right-censored spells. 
Two destination states k are considered, full-time work and other states. 
It is conventional to use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate haz-
ard rate models. One of the main reasons is that maximum likelihood tech-
niques allow one to deal with right-censoring of the unemployment spells. 
The contribution to the likelihood of completed spells of unemployment is 
the density function, evaluated at the time of exit from unemployment. The 
contribution of right-censored spells is the survivor function, evaluated at the 
time of censoring. In the case of the LSUS data, it is necessary to allow for 
the the left truncation of the sample at about three months from the start 
of the unemployment spell. The left truncation interval is set equal to the 
lapse of time between the start of the unemployment spell and the time of 
the first interview, which varies for each unemployed person between 11 and 
17 weeks. Allowing for left truncation, the log-likelihood function for the 
LSUS sample is the following: 
LogL = £{(°m)/?zi(i)} + £ { - ftexpMPxiMdu], (0.5) 
ieA i Jt' 
where A is the set of the completed spells. In the competing risks case, 
the log-likelihood function can be written as follows: 
LogL = E E t ó + ^ W l + E £ { - f exp{ai+^(u)du}(0.6) 
keDüAit kcD i Jt> 
full-time work, k = 1 
other economie states, k = 2. 
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where A^ is the set of completed spells ending into destination state k. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for. It would seem to be the case 
that unobserved heterogeneity is more of a problem when the functional form 
adopted for the baseline hazard is rather restrictive, such as, for instance, 
the monotonie Weibull, than if a flexible baseline is allowed for. Allowing 
for unobserved heterogeneity requires one to make assumptions on its possi-
ble correlation across the two cause-specific hazards which are often rather 
unrealistic11. Moreover, in this case one should also allow unobserved hetero-
genity to differ across the two groups of unemployment benefit recipients and 
consequently make further assumptions about the possible correlation of the 
errors across the two exit states and the two groups. There is no reason to 
believe that imposing these additional restrictions on the estimating model 
would result in less distortions than not controlling for unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity. The main finding of previous studies that have allowed 
for unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risks framework and that have 
specified a flexible baseline hazard rate is that allowing for unobserved het-
erogeneity tends to increase the absolute value of the estimated coefficients 
(Katz and Meyer, 1988). 
IV. Results of estimation 
Non-parametr ic Kaplan-Meier es t imates 
I have first estimated the single risk survivor functions for the two groups of 
"UB only" and "SB" recipients12 non-parametrically, using the Kaplan-Meier 
method (see Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, for a description of this method). 
The duration of the completed spell of unemployment by exit state for the 
recipients of UB only and for the recipients of SB (with or without UB) is 
shown in Table 0.9, in the Appendix. The estimated survivor functions are 
plotted in Figure 0.2. 
The survivor function for recipients of "UB only" Hes above that for the 
other benefit recipients until about week 50. Thereafter, the two curves tend 
to coincide. This suggests that the (conditional) probability of leaving un-
nNormally either zero or perfect correlation is assumed. 
12These two groups are defined with respect to benefit receipts reported at the time of 
the first interview. 
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Figure 0.2: Single risk survivor functions 
employment is higher for the "SB, with or without UB" group rather than 
for the "UB only" group at any point in time until about the 50th week 
of unemployment. Perhaps, this phenomen is explained by the fact that the 
"UB only" unemployed are considerably "richer" than the "SB" unemployed. 
Indeed, higher levels of savings are likely to rise the unemployed's reservation 
wage and with thate the duration of the unemployment spells (Jones et al. 
,1993). On the basis of a Log-Rank test statistics13, the null hypothesis that 
the survivor functions of the two groups of benefit recipients are not statis-
tically different (xl = 9.0) is rejected. The 95% confidence intervals are also 
plotted in Figure 0.2. Except during the first few weeks of unemployment, 
the survivor curve for the "SB" group lies between the two 95% confidence 
bands for the survivor curve of the "UB only" group; the survivor curve 
for the "UB only" group Hes between the two 95% confidence bands of the 
survivor function for the "SB" group14. 
13See Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, pp. 16-18, for a description of this test which is 
based on the Kaplan-Meier Standard errors of the two survivor functions. 
14The lower bound of the survivor curve for the "SB" group is not plotted since the 
survivor function for this group lies behind or coincides with the UB survivor function 
at each point in time, which implies that its confidence band lies also behind the "UB" 
survivor function at each point in time. This confidence band is not plotted in order not 
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Resul ts of est imation of t he mode l for t h e two groups pooled t o -
gether 
The results of estimation of the econometrie model estimated for the two 
groups of the unemployed pooled together are given in Table 0.3. The reader 
is referred to Stancanelli (1993) for a discussion of the estimated impact 
of the explanatory variables. The discussion below focus on the estimated 
impact of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit. 
Table 0.3: Results of estimation of the competing risks model 
Variable Full-time job hazard Other states hazard 
label Coeff SE Coeff SE 
F/t work most of the year ie/ore U. 0.3658* 0.1457 -0.6759* 0.2132 
Unemployed most of tke year hefore U. 0.3389* 0.1559 -0.4452 0.2349 
Sick, out of v/ork, most of the year 4e- -0.4124 0.3114 0.1916 0.1629 
fore U. 
Professional or Intermediate Occupa- 0.2003* 0.1008 0.4823* 0.1992 
tion 
Unskilled Occupation -0.4585* 0.1745 -0.1580 0.2903 
Age 20-24 0.2097 0.1090 -0.0901 0.2417 
Ag e 35-44 -0.1877* 0.0918 0.1172 0.1910 
Age 45-54 -0.6489* 0.1133 -0.2286 0.2194 
Age 55-58. -1.2946* 0.1759 -0.0489 0.2496 
Has any child aged < 5 -0.2225* 0.0886 -0.2079 0.1891 
Married 0.1779 0.1251 -0.2789 0.2007 
Spov.se working in the month hefore U. 0.3389* 0.0905 0.3193 0.1743 
Experience some money shortage 0.2490* 0.0889 -0.2170 0.1918 
Searches less than hefore U. -0.8005* 0.1794 -0.0829 0.3430 
Values Leisure more than Lahour -0.2672* 0.1185 -0.1121 0.2170 
House owner 0.3000* 0.0752 0.2145 0.1823 
County unemployment rate -0.0212 0.0109 -0.0764 0.0891 
Receives UB only -0.0905 0.0943 0.1911 0.1478 
UB/SB time varying, £, logs. -0.0375 0.0643 -0.0269 0.0204 
Expected earnings, £, logs. 0.6631* 0.2079 -0.8274* 0.4152 
Expected earnings not availahle 3.1247* 0.9846 -3.1826 1.9351 
- 6-10 weeks of UB left 0.9313* 0.2452 0.5486 0.6013 
- 5-1 weeks of UB left 0.1513 0.2768 1.2464* 0.3880 
0 weeks of UB left 0.6993 0.6799 3.6317* 0.6735 
+ 1-3 weeks after UB exhaustion 0.3488 0.3074 1.7034* 0.4178 
+ 4 weeks after UB exhaustion 0.54S3* 0.2051 0.9519* 0.3490 
The model is estimated for all benefit ree ipients, i. e . 1941 observations. Dt scrip-
tive statistics of explanatory variables ire providei in Section II. "U. " stands 
for the observed unemployment spell. 1 Tie dichoion IOUS variables take vah ie one 
vihen the condition stated for each of th tra is satisfi ed. A weekly baseline i 3 esti-
mated. The estimated coefficients on th e weekly »ej jments of the baseline ïazard 
rate are given in Table 0.10 in the Appe ndix. The v alue of the max. log-like lihood 
is: 6142.7. A * indicate statistical signij ficance at th e two-sided 5% level. 
to burden the figure with several curves. 
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A perhaps surprising result is that the expected exhaustion of entitlement 
to the national insurance unemployment benefit (UB) is found to influence 
the probabiHty of leaving unemployment to exit to states other than full-
time work more than the probability of re-employment in a full-time job. 
In the full-time job hazard, only the coefficients on the first and the last 
entitlement dummy are found to differ significantly from zero. However, 
the estimated coefficients on the UB entitlement duration dummies are all 
positive, as expected. In the other states hazard, all the UB entitlement 
duration dummies except the first are found to have a statistically significant 
impact. The estimated coefficients are positive as predicted by economie 
theory. 
When there are five to one weeks of benefit entitlement left, the chances 
of leaving unemployment to enter "other states" increase for the "UB only 
unemployed" by three and half times as much in each of these weeks, in 
relation to the base. In the last week of entitlement to UB, the probability of 
exiting to states other than full-time work for "UB only" recipients increases 
enormously, by about 38 times (in relation to the base). Then, from one 
to three weeks after benefit exhaustion, the probability of exiting to other 
states is five and a half times higher in each of these weeks, in relation to 
the base. From four weeks after exhaustion onwards the chances of exiting 
to other states are in each week two and half times larger, in relation to the 
base. 
It is possible that part of the enormous increase in the probability of 
exiting to other states in the last week of entitlement is due to some unem-
ployed classifying themselves as non-registered unemployed under the cate-
gory "other economie activities". Rounding error in the replies is another 
possible explanation since the year, i. e. week 52, corresponds for more than 
90% of the "UB only" unemployed with the time of exhaustion of UB. How-
ever, this does not seem a plausible explanation since the coëfficiënt on the 
dichotomous variable "0 weeks of UB entitlement left" is not significantly 
different from zero in the full-time work hazard. 
The estimated coefficients on the benefit entitlement dummies are signif-
icantly different from each other, as shown in Table 0.4 —at least for those 
dummies that were found to affect significantly the hazard rate. This implies 
that the impact of the expected exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit is different over time. 
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Table 0.4: The significance of the differences between the estimated coeffi-
cients on the benefit entitlement duration dummies 
Benefit duration dummy fin ~ firn SE(fin ~ firn) 
Full-time exit 
-6—10 weeks, -5-1 weeks 0.78* 0.36 
-5-1 weeks, 0 weeks 0.55 0.729 
0 weeks, +1-3 weeks 0.37 0.74 
+1-3weeks, +4 weeks 0.10 0.35 
Other stat es exit 
-6-10 weeks, -5-1 weeks 0.69 0.59 
-5-1 weeks, 0 weeks 2.39* 0.76 
0 weeks, +1-3 weeks 1.93* 0.75 
+l-3weeks, +4 weeks 0.75* 0.48 
A * indicates significance at 1 ,he two sic ed 5% level. 
The estimated baseline hazard for the exit into full-time work is plotted in 
Figure 0.3. The baseline of the same model estimated without controUing for 
the entitlement effect is also plotted for comparison purposes. The estimated 
coefficients on the weekly steps of the baseline hazard are shown in Table 0.10, 
in the Appendix. The two estimated baselines follow a similar pattern over 
time. However, if the effect of the expected exhaustion of entitlement to UB 
is controlled for (with the UB entitlement dummies) the spikes after week 
forty are smaller in size. The other exits baseline is not plotted since the 
estimated coefficients of the weekly baseline for the exit into other states are 
not statisticaüy significantly different from zero. 
The sensitivity of the estimated benefit entitlement effects to different 
specification of the hazard rate is tested below. 
Some sensitivity analysis 
I have tested for the robustness of the estimated coefficients on the two 
sets (for the two exit states out of unemployment considered) of the benefit 
entitlement duration dummies. The results are shown in Table 0.7, in the 
Appendix. First, I compare the results of the competing risks model with 
those of a corresponding single risk model. All the estimated coefficients on 
the UB entitlement duration dummies are significantly different from zero 
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Figure 0.3: Baseline with/without benefit entitlement duration dummies 
and positive in the single risk model. The estimated coëfficiënt on the dummy 
for the last week of entitlement to UB is more than twice the size of the 
coefficients on the other entitlement dummies. However, following the results 
of estimation of the competing risks model (see Table 0.3) we know that 
the expected exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment benefit affects the 
hazard of exit into other states more than the full-time work hazard. This 
confirms the importance of using competing risks models of the hazard rate. 
Many previous studies on the benefit entitlement effect were instead carried 
out in a single risk framework of analysis. 
The main model of Table 0.3 was then re-estimated excluding the dummy 
for recipients of "UB only" from the regressors (Model (1) of Table 0.7). The 
likelihood ratio test, which is given in the last column of Table 0.7, indi-
cates that the null hypothesis that the coëfficiënt on this additional regressor 
(dummy for receipt of "UB only") is not significantly different from zero can-
not be rejected. However, the significance and the sign of the coefficients on 
the two sets (for the two exits) of time varying dummies for the duration of 
entitlement to UB are not affected. The magnitude of the estimated coeffi-
cients on the entitlement duration dummies does not change substantially. 
The model (without the dummy for receipt of "UB only") was then esti-
mated with an additional time varying dummy taking value one from week 
11 (corresponding to the observed start of the unemployment spell because 
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of the left truncation of the sample) to week 41 for recipients of UB only 
(Model (2)15). The addition of this variable allows the baseline hazard rate 
to shift for recipients of "UB only" from the start of the unemployment spell 
rather than from week 42. The estimated coëfficiënt on this additional vari-
able is statistically not significant for any of the two competing risks exits. 
On the basis of a likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that the impact 
of the additional regressor is not significantly different from zero cannot be 
rejected. 
Model (3) inchide only the entitlement duration dummies (and the weekly 
"pieces" of the baseline hazard rate) as explanatory variables. On the basis 
of a likelihood ratio test, the model with more regressors perforrns better. 
The interest of estimating model (3) is to test the robustness of the estimated 
coefficients on the entitlement duration dummies. The significance and the 
sign of the coefficients is not affected except for the coëfficiënt of the dummy 
"week 0 to week 41", which becomes significant for the hazard of exit into full-
time work. Also, the sign of the estimated coëfficiënt on the dummy "week 
47-51" (not significant) becomes now negative for the full-time work hazard. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients does not change substantiaüy, 
at least for those coefficients that are statistically significant (except for the 
coëfficiënt on the dummy "week 0-41" in the full-time work hazard). 
In model (4), the baseline hazard rate is allo wed to vary every two weeks 
rather than each week. On the basis of a likelihood ratio test, of model (4) 
against model (2) —which is the right unrestricted model to consider given 
that both model (2) and (4) include the dummy "week 0 to week41" and ex-
clude the dummy for receipt of "UB only"— model (4) perforrns better than 
model (2). However, the statistical significance, the sign and the magnitude 
of the UB entitlement coefficients do not change considerably except for the 
coefficients on the last week of entitlement (week 52). The coefficients on the 
last week of entitlement (for both hazards of exit into full-time work and into 
other states) are in model (4) almost half the size than the corresponding 
coefficients of model (2). In particular, the other exits hazard is found to 
15Model (2) does not include the dummy for receipt of "UB only" among the regressors 
since when the time varying dummy "week 0 to week 41" is added to the model, the set 
of time varying dummies for the duration of entitlement to UB and the dummy for the 
receipt of "UB only" are highly collinear. This is the reason why model (2) is compared 
with model (1) rather than with the "Base" model. 
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increase during the last week of UB entitlèment for "UB only" recipients by 
seven times (in relation to the base), according to model (4), and by about 
34 times, according to model (2). 
Finally, I have estimated a Weibull model (see Table 0.7). The signes of 
the coefficients on the benefit duration dummies are the same as in model (2). 
The significance and the magnitude of the coefficients on the UB entitlèment 
dummies are quite different from those of model (2). In particular, the 
estimated coefficients for the other states hazard rate are larger in magnitude 
than in model (2). The estimated coëfficiënt on the last dummy ("+ 4 weeks 
onwards") is not significant in any of the two exits, while it is significant for 
both exits in model (2). Significant negative time dependency is detected in 
both hazards. 
To sum up, it is possible to conclude that there is some firm evidence 
that the expected exhaustion of the national insurance benefit (UB) raises 
the hazard rate of the "UB only" unemployed. In particular, the hazard of 
exit into states other than full-time work is found to rise significantly for 
recipients of UB (only) near the time of exhaustion of the national insurance 
unemployment benefit. However, the size of the estimated effects is not 
robust to different specification of the baseline hazard rate. 
Results of the model estimated separately for the two groups 
The competing risks model presented in Section III was next estimated sepa-
rately for the two groups of benefit recipients. The UB entitlèment dummies 
are dropped from the two models. The results of estimation for the explana-
tory variables and for the exit into full-time work are given in Table 0.6 in 
the Appendix. 
The hypothesis that the two groups of benefit recipients do not differ 
with regards to their (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment is 
strongly rejected on the basis of a likelihood ratio test (xlso — 186.8). One 
can then conclude that the type of benefit received at about the start of the 
unemployment spell afFects significantly the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment. A possible explanation for this result is to be found in the 
different duration of entitlèment to the two types of unemployment benefit: 
UB lasts for a year; SB may last for ever. 
The estimated hazard rates for a representative individual for both groups 
of benefit recipients and for exit into full-time work are plotted in Figure 0.4. 
20 
baseline hazard rate 
0.03-1 
13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 
unemployment duration (weeks) 
Representative individual, continuous 
variables take maan value, dummies are 
zero but married and any ehild less 5. 
Figure 0.4: Hazard rates. Full-tïme work exit 
The corresponding hazards for exit into other states are plotted in Figure . 
The representative individual is constructed assuming that all continuous 
variables take their mean value; the dummy for whether the unemployed is 
"married" and the dummy for whether he has "any child aged less than five" 
take value one; all the other dummies are set to zero, i. e. the unemployed 
person is assumed to be in the base group of these dummies. 
Following the theoretical predictions, given the expected limited duration 
of entitlement to UB, the hazard rate for recipients of "UB only" should 
show larger spikes near the time of benefit exhaustion. The hazard rate for 
recipients of SB (with or without UB) should be smoother over time. 
Indeed, the estimated hazard rate for recipients of "UB only" shows larger 
spikes and more variability over time than the estimated hazard for SB re-
cipients. Of course, this finding is partly explained by the smaller number 
of the unemployed in the "UB only" group. It might, however, also indicate 
that the job search behaviour of recipients of "UB only" is more sensitive to 
the elapsing of time than that of recipients of SB (with or without UB). 
Finally, I have tested how different levels of savings (and debt) affect 
the unemployment duration of the two groups. It was shown in Section 
III that the unemployed in the two groups have very different distributions 
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of savings —I am interested in the unemployed's savings more than in the 
unemployed's debt since the award of SB is determined on the basis of the 
unemployed's level of savings16. The levels of savings and debt considered 
relate to one month before the start of the observed unemployment spell. 
This reference time is chosen in order to avoid potential endogeneity, since 
the unemployed's levels of savings (and debt) may vary as a function of the 
duration of the unemployment spells. These variables are entered in levels 
because the assumption of a constant elasticity of the hazard rate does not 
appear reasonable (given the large variation in the distribution of savings of 
the unemployed). 
The estimated coefficients on levels of savings and debt are reported in 
Table 0.5. None of them is statistically significantly different from zero except 
for the coëfficiënt on the debt variable for the full-time work hazard of the 
"SB with or without UB" group17. Therefore, the hazard rate of the "UB 
16The relationship between the unemployed's wealth and the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment is the subject of Jones et al. (1993)), to which the reader is 
referred. 
17The negative sign on this coëfficiënt is perhaps due to the fact that debt may proxy 
access to credit and probably access to credit has a positive impact on the reservation 
wage. 
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Table 0.5: The impact of savings on the hazard rates of two groups 
Variable Recipients 
FuU-time work 
of UB only 
Other exits 
Recipients of SB, 
FuU-time work 
with/witout UB 
Other exits 
Total savings, in 
100 £ 
Total debt, in 100 
£ 
-0.0012 (0.0010) 
0.0009 (0.0032) 
•0.0012 (0.0013) 
0.0054 (0.0053) 
0.0004 (0.0032) 
-0.0049* (0.0025) 
0.0026 (0.0041) 
-0.0027 (0.0043) 
Max. log-lik. 
Lik. ratio test 
-2326.9 
X?=3.6 
-3636.1 
XÏ = 37.8 
The estimated models are the same as those of Table 0.6, except for the inclusion of the savings 
and debt variables. The baseline hazard rates are allowed to vary each week. Deseriptive statistics 
of the explanatory variables are provided in the Table 0.1. A * indicates statistical significante 
at the two-sided 5% level. Standard errors are given in brackets. The likelihood ratio tests are 
carried out against the models shown in Table 0.6. 
only" unemployed is not affected by their levels of savings (or debt). The 
hazard rate of the "SB with or without UB" unemployed is neither affected 
by the unemployed's savings. It is, instead, influenced though to a minor 
extent by the unemployed's level of debt. 
On the basis of a likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that the ad-
ditional variables (savings and debt levels) do not have a significant impact 
on the hazard rate cannot be rejected for the "UB only group". However, 
the same hypothesis is rejected for the "SB with or without UB" group. One 
might conclude that the level of savings (and debt) of the unemployed is 
unlikely to affect the estimated impact of the duration of entitlement to the 
national insurance unemployment benefit on the hazard rate. 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have analysed the relationship between the duration of enti-
tlement to the national insurance benefit (UB) and the individual probability 
of leaving unemployment, in the UK. 
I have found some evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the (condi-
tional) probability of leaving unemployment rises for the recipients of "UB 
only" near the time of exhaustion of entitlement to UB. However, the ex-
pected exhaustion of entitlement to UB is found to raise the (conditional) 
probability of exiting into "other states" more than the (conditional) prob-
ability of exiting into fuU-time work. This result is in line with the findings 
of Wadsworth (1991b), who concluded that non-claimants of unemployment 
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benefit have a higher withdrawal rate from the labour force than benefit 
claimants. 
However, the estimates of the impact of the expected exhaustion of enti-
tlement to UB are sensitive to the specification of the baseline hazard rate 
adopted. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude on the size of the esti-
mated effect. A larger dataset would probably be needed in order to obtain 
robust estimates of the effect of the duration of entitlement to the national 
insurance unemployment benefit on the individual probability of leaving un-
employment. 
The results of the analysis carried out in this study highlight the impor-
tance of using competing risks specifications of the hazard rate. 
Tinbergen Institute and Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam 
June 1994 
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Appendix 
Table 0.6: Results of estimation of the re-employment probability 
Variable Recipients of UB only SB/ joint SB and UB All benefits 
label CoefJ SE CoefJ SE CoefJ SE 
F/t work year before -0.1398 0.2535 0.5969* 0.1778 0.3584* 0.1556 
Unemployed year before 0.1673 0.2859 0.44^0* 0.1868 0.4197* 0.1448 
Sick year before -0.6378 0.5591 -0.3729 0.3765 
-0.4257 0.3113 
Profes. /Interm. Occ. 0.3244* 0.1609 0.0739 0.1337 0.2034* 0.1003 
Unskilled Occupation -0.5214 0.2999 -0.4298* 0.2158 -0.4485* 0.1744 
Age 20-24 0.3357 0.1993 0.1531 0.1318 0.2035 0.1087 
Ag e 35-44 -0.1134 0.1617 -0.2378* 0.1133 -0.2084* 0.0919 
Age 45-54 -0.8165* 0.1693 -0.4552* 0.1590 -0.6067* 0.1123 
Age 55-58 -1.4538* 0.2243 -0.7950* 0.3173 -1.2036* 0.1742 
Has any child aged < 5 -0.6509* 0.1767 -0.0672 0.1070 -0.2355* 0.0883 
Married 0.5777* 0.2366 -0.0791 0.1554 0.1682 0.1244 
Spouse working month before 0.2697* 0.1292 0.3375* 0.1323 0.4071* 0.0874 
Searches less than before -1.1211* 0.2712 -O.4995* 0.2368 -0.7646* 0.1794 
Values Leisure more -0.1046 0.1730 -0.3279* 0.1659 -0.2588* 0.1182 
Experience money shortage 0.1861 0.1269 0.2213 0.1281 0.1905* 0.0875 
House owner 0.1981 0.1253 0.2815* 0.0988 0.3000* 0.0748 
County unemployment rate -0.0273 0.0172 -0.0144 0.0141 -2.0014 1.0881 
UB/SB time varying -0.0958 0.0791 0.0852 0.1155 -0.0706 0.0556 
Predicted earnings 0.6910* 0.3551 0.7417* 0.2612 0.6522* 0.2076 
No pred. earn. 3.8496* 1.6559 3.1346* 1.2504 3.0254* 0.9831 
UB only max. lik. -2328.7; SB / joint SB, UB ma x. lik. -3655, all benefit recipients max. lik. 
-6077.0. Likelihood ratio test: 186.6 ~ Xi 5 0- Desc riptive statist 'es of explanatory variables are 
provided in the preceding table, in the a ata section. A * indicat es statistical significance at the 
two-sided 5% level. The estimated baseli ne coefficiei lts are given 'n the Appendix. 
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Table 0.7: Sensitivity analysis 
Eatimated Model 
(Same covariatea 
aa main model) 
9 52 weeks 
Unemployment 
- 6-10 weeks 
Benefit entitler 
- 5-1 weeks 
nent duratio 
0 weeka 
n Dummiea 
+ 1-3 weeka + 4^x> 
Max. 
Log Uk. 
Base Model, ft 
Base Model, oth 
0.9313* 
(0.2452) 
0.5486 
(0.6013) 
0.1513 
(0.2768) 
1.2464* 
(0.3880) 
0.6993 
(0.6799) 
3.6317* 
(0.6735) 
0.3488 
(0.3074) 
1.7034* 
(0.4178) 
0.5463 
(0.2051) 
0.9519* 
(0.3490) 
-6142.7 
Single risk model 0.8695* 
(0.2268) 
0.4845* 
(0.2183) 
1.7570* 
(O.474I) 
0.8741* 
(0.2258) 
0.7070* 
(0.1689) 
-5656.3 
Model (1), f-t, 
Model (1), oth. 
0.8862* 
(0.2404) 
0.4349 
(0.5924) 
0.1049 
(0.2724) 
1.1368* 
(0.3740) 
0.6652 
(0.6783) 
3.5145* 
(0.6637) 
0.3153 
(0.3047) 
1.6006* 
(0.4050) 
0.5073* 
(0.2002) 
0.8418* 
(0.3320) 
-6143.7 
M(l), Baae 
M 
Model (2), f-t 
Model (2), oth 
-0.0905 
(0.0943) 
-0.2170 
(0.1918) 
0.8408* 
(0.2450) 
0.3316 
(0.6003) 
0.0608 
(0.2762) 
1.0294* 
(0.3862) 
0.6088 
(0.6814) 
3.4U7* 
(0.6704) 
0.2583 
(0.3109) 
1.4864* 
(0.4187) 
0.4558* 
(0.2078) 
0.7349* 
(0.3467) 
-6142.6 
M(2), M(l) 
X\ = 2.2 
Model (3), ft 
Model (3), oth 
-0.1929* 
(0.0785) 
-0.1833 
(0.1628) 
0.6895* 
(0.2417) 
0.3362 
(0.5924) 
-0.1152 
(0.2732) 
1.0533* 
(0.3754) 
0.4978 
(0.6836) 
3.5277* 
(0.6477) 
0.1271 
(0.2976) 
1.8134* 
(0.3840) 
O.4O68* 
(0.1945) 
0.8832* 
(0.3089) 
-6308.1 
M(3), M(2) 
x | 0 = 331 
Model (4), f-t 
Model (4), oth 
-0.0901 
(0.0943) 
-0.2128 
(0.1917) 
0.7524* 
(0.2324) 
0.2369 
(0.5723) 
0.0880 
(0.2735) 
0.9454* 
(0.3726) 
0.3795 
(0.6252) 
1.9547* 
(0.5998) 
0.3229 
(0.3046) 
1.8666* 
(0.3971) 
0.4452* 
(0.2065) 
0.7912* 
(0.3434) 
-6170.0 
M(4), M(2) 
X54 = 54-8 
Weibull, f-t 
Weibull parame-
ter exp(-0.55)* 
(SE 0.13) 
Weibull, oth 
Weibull parame-
ter exp(-0.7l)* 
(SE 0.32) 
-0.1637 
(0.1669) 
-0.4433 
(0.4217) 
1.1873* 
(0.4U4) 
0.1138 
(1.0648) 
0.2318 
(0.4470) 
2.2906* 
(1.0697) 
0.0760 
(1.0253) 
3.5466 * 
(1.6218) 
0.6174 
(0.5081) 
3.2953* 
(1.3758) 
0.6565 
(0.3732) 
1.7268 
(0.9652) 
-62104 
The base model ia the model of Table 0.3. "f-t" stands for full-time work exit. "oth" stands for other states exit. Standard 
errors are given in bracketa. The "UB only" dummy which takea value one for the recipienta of "UB only" (which waa 
hoviever not aignificantly different from zero jn the baae model) ia dropped from model (1), (2), (3), (4), (5). Model 
(1) ia the aame aa the baae model except for the excluaion of this "UB only" dummy from the regressora. Model (2) ia 
the same as model (1) except for the incluaion of the dummy "Week 0-41", which takea value one from week 1 to week 
41 for the recipienta of "UB only". Model (3) has only the time varying dummies "time left to exhaustion of UB" as 
regressors and the weekly baseline constants. Model (4) is the same as model (2), but the baseline hazard rate is allowed 
to vary each two weeks rather than each week. A * indicate statistical significance at the two-sided 5% level. The value 
of the maximiaed log-likelihood and the value of the likelihood ratio teat between the two modela indicated in turna are 
given in the laat column of the Table. The likelihood ratio-teat ia diatributed aa a "x~" with degreea of freedom equol to 
the number of reatrictions. 
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TableO.8: Baseline hazard: Benefit recipients types. Exit into full-time work. 
Weekly Recipients of UB only Recipients of SB, joint SB and UB All benefit recipients 
Baseline Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Week .11 -23.4951 14613.5149 -24.2043 6777.3044 -21.0798 2052.2847 
Week 12 -23.6266 2839.1168 -9.3265* 1.6010 -8.8373* 1.3882 
Week 13 -6.7597* 1.6600 -8.3058* 1.2917 -7.1689* 0.9950 
Week 14 -6.9255* 1.6497 -8.2095* 1.2738 -7.1730* 0.9838 
Week 15 -6.3620* 1.6321 -8.2986* 1.2741 -6.9696* 0.9783 
Week 16 -6.5565* 1.6362 -8.1309* 1.2699 -6.9776* 0.9784 
Week 17 -6.4617* 1.6349 -8.1742* 1.2707 -6.9587* 0.9781 
Week 18 -6.2430* 1.6323 -8.7997* 1.2913 -7.1078* 0.9813 
Week 19 -6.9114* 1.6491 -8.1414* 1.2703 -7.1230* 0.9817 
Week 20 -6.5914* 1.6407 -8.7670* 1.2908 -7.3189* 0.9864 
Week 21 -7.2682* 1.6660 -8.3106* 1.2754 -7.3538* 0.9877 
Week 22 -6.9659* 1.6531 -8.8584* 1.2963 -7.5634* 0.9939 
Week 23 -7.4240* 1.6753 -8.4371* 1.2798 -7.4886* 0.9918 
Week 24 -7.0725* 1.6587 -8.1290* 1.2715 -7.1676* 0.9841 
Week 25 -7.1925* 1.6658 -8.2428* 1.2756 -7.2835* 0.9877 
Week 26 -7.1624* 1.6645 -8.0237* 1.2708 -7.1186* 0.9843 
Week 27 -6.6246* 1.6447 -8.4419* 1.2833 -7.1887* 0.9864 
Week 28 -6.3996* 1.6392 -8.2546* 1.2776 -6.9871* 0.9824 
Week 29 -6.9071* 1.6571 -8.2370* 1.2775 -7.1879* 0.9873 
Week 30 -6.6239* 1.6462 -8.3829* 1.2827 -7.1650* 0.9870 
Week 31 -6.3785* 1.6408 -8.1923* 1.2768 -6.9528* 0.9826 
Week 32 -6.9613* 1.6639 -8.1711* 1.2761 -7.1646* 0.9879 
Week 33 -6.2185* 1.6382 -7.7610* 1.2668 -6.6389* 0.9776 
Week 34 -6.2630* 1.6408 -8.0445* 1.2740 -6.8252* 0.9816 
Week 35 -6.6758* 1.6570 -8.5874* 1.2949 -7.3141* 0.9952 
Week 36 -7.5065* 1.7140 -8.5781* 1.2949 -7.6139* 1.0074 
Week 37 -6.9767* 1.6747 -7.9216* 1.2718 -6.9923* 0.9867 
Week 38 -6.9492* 1.6745 -8.2119* 1.2818 -7.1920* 0.9933 
Week 39 -6.9257* 1.6742 -8.1062* 1.2785 -7.1124* 0.9913 
Week 40 -7.4184* 1.7128 -8.0878* 1.2787 -7.2203* 0.9952 
Week 41 -7.8158* 1.7607 -8.3574* 1.2890 -7.5152* 1.0070 
Week 42 -6.6765* 1.6617 -8.9392* 1.3232 -7.5007* 1.0068 
Week 43 -6.8241* 1.6716 -8.3364* 1.2891 -7.2394* 0.9972 
Week 44 -5.9046* 1.6374 -8.1152* 1.2809 -6.7143* 0.9831 
Week 45 -6.7555* 1.6732 -8.1915* 1.2846 -7.1209* 0.9951 
Week 46 -6.3731* 1.6558 -8.3993* 1.2942 -7.0984* 0.9950 
Week 47 -7.1891* 1.7138 -7.8888* 1.2750 -7.0093* 0.9929 
Week 48 -6.8860* 1.6890 -8.2425* 1.2882 -7.2025* 1.0000 
Week 49 -6.8626* 1.6888 -8.3347* 1.2934 -7.2573* 1.0031 
Week 50 -6.6192* 1.6737 -8.3157* 1.2937 -7.1564* 1.0000 
Week 51 -7.6157* 1.7487 -8.7769* 1.3223 -7.7896* 1.0282 
Week 52 -7.5969* 1.7485 -8.2883* 1.2939 -7.4155* 1.0074 
Week 53 -6.3004* 1.6430 -8.1480* 1.2884 -6.9170* 0.9885 
Week 54 -6.6039* 1.6607 -8.1289* 1.2883 -7.0279* 0.9930 
Week 55 -23.4084 1999.8754 -7.9049* 1.2808 -7.2512* 1.0029 
Week 56 -6.5535* 1.6589 -8.9047* 1.3414 -7.4315* 1.0128 
Week 57 -7.0485* 1.6987 -8.6652* 1.3222 -7.5327* 1.0194 
Week 58 -7.4357* 1.7468 -8.3134* 1.3003 -7.3978* 1.0125 
Week 59 -6.4868* 1.6580 -8.6316* 1.3222 -7.2705* 1.0069 
Week 60 -8.0879* 1.8836 -7.8104* 1.2806 -7.0618* 0.9986 
Week 61 -6.9569* 1.6967 -8.8117* 1.3412 -7.5828* 1.0279 
Week 62 -6.6389* 1.6718 -9.4933* 1.4313 -7.7212* 1.0394 
Week 63 -6.3788* 1.6567 -8.7743* 1.3411 -7.2858* 1.0123 
Week 64 -7.1095* 1.7445 -8.1976* 1.3090 -7.2269* 1.0189 
Week 65 -6.5076* 1.6894 -8.6855* 1.3708 -7.3085* 1.0371 
A * indicates statist ical signific. mee at the 5° %s two-sidec 
level. 
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Table 0.9: Unemployment duration by the exit states 
Recipiënt} of UB only Recipiënt» of SB 
Unemployment duration Freqiteney of Exits Frequency of Exits 
in Weeks Full-Time Work Exit Otker States Exit Full-Time Work Exit Otker States Exit 
IS 0 0 1 1 
13 7 5 9 3 
14 9 6 15 8 
is 17 3 15 4 
16 14 2 18 4 
n 15 4 17 l 
18 18 0 9 5 
19 9 0 17 2 
S0 IS 3 9 1 
SI 6 1 14 S 
SS 8 0 8 S 
SS 5 1 12 1 
U 7 1 16 1 
SS 6 4 14 s 
S6 6 1 17 7 
27 10 3 11 S 
SS 12 S 13 3 
S9 7 3 13 1 
30 9 1 11 4 
31 11 6 13 6 
3S 6 0 13 0 
33 12 S 19 S 
34 11 1 14 S 
35 7 1 8 2 
36 3 1 8 0 
37 5 s 15 4 
38 5 4 11 3 
39 5 4 IS 2 
40 3 l 12 8 
41 S s 9 S 
42 6 0 5 0 
43 5 s 9 1 
44 12 1 11 3 
45 5 s 10 3 
46 7 0 8 3 
47 3 3 13 S 
48 4 1 9 1 
49 4 s 8 5 
50 5 5 8 3 
51 S S 5 1 
5S 2 5 8 3 
53 7 7 9 S 
54 5 3 9 1 
55 0 S 11 1 
56 5 S 4 2 
57 3 0 5 2 
58 2 3 7 2 
59 5 1 5 4 
60 1 0 11 S 
61 3 5 4 1 
6S 4 1 2 3 
63 5 1 4 1 
64 S 0 6 S 
65 3 0 2 
66 1 
Sa 7n 347 112 548 1S6 
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Table 0.10: Baseline hazards: model with time varying benefit exhaustion 
dummies 
Weekly Full-time exit Other states exit 
Baseline Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Week 11 -22.3227 3561.8353 -15.6797 3561.8353 
Week 12 -8.9468* 1.3949 -1.0158 1.3949 
Week 13 -7.2835* 1.0039 -0.0352 1.0039 
Week 14 -7.2893* 0.9929 0.0726 0.9929 
Week 15 -7.0883* 0.9874 -0.6833 0.9874 
Week 16 -7.0966* 0.9874 -0.8675 0.9874 
Week 17 -7.0782* 0.9872 -1.0390 0.9872 
Week 18 -7.2289* 0.9903 -1.0022 0.9903 
Week 19 -7.2477* 0.9907 -1.9192 0.9907 
Week 20 -7.4478* 0.9955 -1.2434 0.9955 
Week 21 -7.4855* 0.9967 -1.4816 0.9967 
Week 22 -7.6970* 1.0030 -1.8848 1.0030 
Week 23 -7.6206* 1.0008 -1.8546 1.0008 
Week 24 -7.3033* 0.9931 -1.8626 0.9931 
Week 25 -7.4183* 0.9967 -0.7222 0.9967 
Week 26 -7.2530* 0.9933 -0.4059 0.9933 
Week 27 -7.3249* 0.9955 -0.8591 0.9955 
Week 28 -7.1240* 0.9916 -0.8841 0.9916 
Week 29 -7.3260* 0.9965 -1.0862 0.9965 
Week 30 -7.3031* 0.9962 -0.8430 0.9962 
Week 31 -7.0911* 0.9918 0.0847 0.9918 
Week 32 -7.3085* 0.9969 -15.5589 0.9969 
Week 33 -6.7858* 0.9867 -1.0143 0.9867 
Week 34 -6.9685* 0.9909 -1.2301 0.9909 
Week 35 -7.4561* 1.0044 -1.2150 1.0044 
Week 36 -7.7557* 1.0165 -2.3279 1.0165 
Week 37 -7.1348* 0.9961 -0.4855 0.9961 
Week 38 -7.3331* 1.0025 -0.3234 1.0025 
Week 39 -7.2520* 1.0005 -0.4451 1.0005 
Week 40 -7.3587* 1.0042 -1.1677 1.0042 
Week 41 -7.6509* 1.0158 -0.8189 1.0158 
Week 42 -8.1353* 1.0201 -15.8033 1.0201 
Week 43 -7.8684* 1.0105 -1.4831 1.0105 
Week 44 -7.3347* 0.9967 -1.1379 0.9967 
Week 45 -7.7404* 1.0084 -0.8929 1.0084 
Week 46 -7.4818* 1.0057 -1.6555 1.0057 
Week 47 -7.3926* 1.0037 -1.1205 1.0037 
Week 48 -7.5866* 1.0108 -2.0238 1.0108 
Week 49 -7.6414* 1.0139 -0.7489 1.0139 
Week 50 -7.5400* 1.0107 -0.5855 1.0107 
Week 51 -8.3098* 1.0655 -3.4033 1.0655 
Week 52 -7.8311* 1.0229 -0.8688 1.0229 
Week 53 -7.3296* 1.0042 -0.7110 1.0042 
Week 54 -7.4382* 1.0086 -1.5000 1.0086 
Week 55 -7.6639* 1.0184 -1.7766 JJQ184 
Week 56 -7.8969* 1.0258 -1.0794 1.0258 
Week 57 -7.9989* 1.0324 -1.7609 1.0324 
Week 58 -7.8621* 1.0255 -0.8294 1.0255 
Week 59 -7.7348* 1.0200 -0.8108 1.0200 
Week 60 -7.5311* 1.0119 -1.7127 1.0119 
Week 61 -8.0475* 1.0406 -0.5945 1.0406 
Week 62 -8.1849* 1.0520 -0.9857 1.0520 
Week 63 -7.7474* 1.0251 -1.6517 1.0251 
Week 64 -7.6964* 1.0319 -1.4670 1.0319 
Week 65 -7.7799* 1.0492 -15.9100 1.0492 
A * indicates statisti< :al significa] ace at the tw o-sided 5% level. 
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